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LEARNING TO LOVE AFTER LEARNING TO HARM:
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION, GENDER
EQUALITY AND CULTURAL VALUES
Penelope Andrews*
INTRODUCTION
The ANC seeks to deprive Zulu men of their manhood by taking away their
cultural weapons.'
A few months ago, South Africans were captured by a high profile
criminal trial, one that involved an allegation of rape against South
Africa's former Deputy-President, Jacob Zuma, who had been dis-
missed by President Thabo Mbeki in the wake of a corruption scandal
just a few months prior to the rape allegation.2 The charge of rape
surfaced after a young woman, whose parents were close friends of Mr.
Zuma, and whom she regarded as an uncle, visited his house as an
overnight guest. She alleged that during this visit, he had sex with her
against her will.3
The trial, which lasted about two months, polarized South Africans
in very discomforting ways.' The fault lines were predictable at one
level, but on another they were rather surprising. The predictability
related to issues around ideology and in particular ethnicity, that is, Mr.
* Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law, B.A.
LL.B. (Natal), LL.M. (Columbia). The author wishes to thank the students of the Michigan
State University College of Law Journal of International Law for the invitation to the
symposium and the Professional Development Committee of the CUNY School of Law for
research assistance. She also thanks Dejana Perrone (CUNY class of 2008) for research
assistance. Part of the title of this paper is derived from, Catherine Campbell, Learning to Kill?
Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal, 18 J. S. AFR. STUD. (SPECIALISSUE) 614 (1992).
1. Catherine Campbell, Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in
Natal, 18 J. S. AFR. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 614 (1992) (quoting King Goodwill Zwelithini,
Weekly Mail, May 31, 1991).
2. The corruption scandal led to a charge of corruption against Mr. Zuma, and that
trial will commence in South Africa later in 2006. See Jamie Jansen, South Africa Judge
Postpones Zuma Corruption Trial Until September, JURIST, July 31, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/south-africa-judge-postpones-zuma.php.
3. See SA Court hears of "Rape" by Zuma, BBC NEws,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4777616.stm; see also Michael Wines, A Highly Charged Rape
Trial Shakes South Africa's Ideals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A3.
4. Anna Koblank, South Africa Rape Trial Dashes Hope for Change, WOMEN'S E-
NEws, Mar. 24,2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/268 /context/archive.
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Zuma, being a prominent Zulu politician, was supported over-
whelmingly by Zulu people.5 But Mr. Zuma's support extended beyond
ethnic allegiances. His ideological support came from those who
broadly represented the more progressive elements in South African
society, namely, the official trade union federation and the Communist
Party.6 What was somewhat surprising was the support from women,
again overwhelmingly Zulu women, but not entirely so.' When the not-
guilty verdict was pronounced, after intense speculation in the media,
there were scenes of joy outside the Johannesburg High Court.8 I was
in Johannesburg on that Monday in May, 2006 when the verdict was
announced, and like my fellow South Africans, I too was struck by the
responses outside of the courthouse. Thousands of Zuma supporters
had gathered outside the courthouse in anticipation of the verdict, and
their joy at his acquittal was reminiscent of the joy (on the part of some
individuals and groups) that accompanied the acquittal of a famous
American some years back.9 Newspaper reports indicated that there
were about two thousand supporters of the Deputy-President gathered
outside the court.'0
During the opening phases of the trial, it was reported that some
Zuma supporters attempted to stone a woman whom they thought to be
the complainant, when she arrived at the courthouse. " They shouted all
kinds of slurs at the young woman, suggesting that she was morally
deficient. Their contempt for the complainant seemed to flow partly
5. See Carnival Atmosphere at Zuma Rape Trial, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Feb.
13, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=264020&area=/zuma report/zuma
-news/.
6. See Vicky Robinson et al., 23 Days that Shook Our World, MAIL & GUARDIAN
ONLINE, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=270344&area=/zuma
_report/zumajinsight/.
7. Mphutlane Wa Bofelo, Zuma Trial - Opinion: 100% Zulu Boy, 100% Patri-
archal, 100 % Tribalist, AGENDA, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.agenda.org.za/index.php?option=
corn_content&task=view&id=1 186&Itemid=147.
8. Crowds Stand by Zuma in Rape Case, BBC NEWS, Aug. 29, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4708960.stm. One man in the crowd compared Jacob Zuma
to Bill Clinton: "Both presidents, who were accused by a woman." Id.
9. Referring to the O.J. Simpson trial.
10. Rape: Ex-S'African Deputy President Escapes Jail, DAILY SUN, May 9, 2006,
http://www.sunnewsonline.conlwebpages/news/national/2006/may/09/national-9-05-2006-
009.htm.
11. Victim of Alleged Rape by Zuma Flees to Denmark, INKYGOBLIN, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.inkygoblin.org/index.php/archivesdate/20O6/02.
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from her role as an HIV activist in the country, and one who disclosed
her HIV-positive status.12 Zuma supporters suggested that because she
is HIV positive, she probably is a prostitute, and that her complaint was
false. "
But this boisterous support for Mr. Zuma outside the courthouse also
led to disappointment and dismay, although such reaction, more muted,
came from a much smaller group of people, mostly women. They
belonged to a group called "People Opposed to Women Abuse"
(POWA), and they, of course, came to court in support of the com-
plainant. 4 For them the rape trial and its responses provided the
occasion to highlight the devastating incidence and consequences of
rape in South Africa. 5
For the South African public, watching these events unfold were
quite painful. The pain came not from the trial and acquittal, but from
the polarization that such an issue, namely an act of sexual violence
against a female, has generated. Violence against women is one of the
central challenges that the post-apartheid democratic South African
society faces, and it is an issue of great concern to activists and
scholars.' 6 Despite one of the most admired constitutions in the world, 7
containing a most expansive bills of rights,'8 in addition to a legislature
and judiciary formally committed to gender equality and the eradication
of violence against women, the response to the Zuma rape trial raised
some troubling questions. The trial brought the issue of violence
12. Id. See also Editorial, Zuma Turmoil Twists Reality, SUNDAYTIMES, Feb. 19,2006,
http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/articles/article-special report.aspx?ID=ST6A171147.
13. These sentiments are set against a backdrop of extreme prejudice against H1V
positive individuals in South Africa. Such prejudice is very distressing in a country where the
incidence of the HIV/AIDS is so high. For the deleterious consequences of the prejudice and
fear of HIV/AIDS, see Tina Rosenberg, When A Pill is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug.
6, 2006, at 40.
14. Abraham McLaughlin, Key Trial Forces South Africa to ConfrontRape, CHRISTIAN
So. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0324/pOlsO4-
woaf.html.
15. Id.
16. See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of
Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 425 (1999); see also
Christelle Terreblanche, Women the Losers in Zuma Rape Case, INDEPENDENT ONLINE,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/south-africa-judge-postpones-zuma.php.
17. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 [hereinafter THE CONSTITIMON]; see also Karl Klare,
Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
18. See THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 17, The Bill of Rights, ch. 2.
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against women, and particularly the horrendous incidence of rape, out
into the open.' 9 The trial centered another issue of enormous concern
to South Africans, namely, the spread of the HIV virus. Mr. Zuma's
admission, that after he had unprotected sex with the complainant, he
had a shower to protect himself against being infected, was a specta-
cular testimony to the cavalier manner with which the spread of the
virus has been treated by some prominent politicians.2' These twin
concerns of South Africans, violence against women, and the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, were exposed to public evaluation and scrutiny by
the trial, and for the most part allowed a national debate to occur.
But another issue surfaced during the trial, namely, how gender
relations, particularly sexual relations, are mediated through cultural
norms. Mr. Zuma had raised a cultural defense to claim that the sex
engaged in between him and the complainant was not coerced, but
consensual. 2 He alleged that his response, namely initiating and
engaging in sexual intercourse with the complainant was demanded by
his status as a Zulu male, and that it would be regarded as culturally
inappropriate not to satisfy a sexually aroused woman.22 In Mr. Zuma's
testimony he stated that "in the Zulu culture, you cannot just leave a
woman if she is ready" and that "to deny her sex, would have been
tantamount to rape".23 It is unclear whether this cultural defense was
dispositive to this acquittal, but it did highlight the issue in the wider
South African context.24
The question that the Zuma trial and its aftermath raised was how a
country with such a wonderful Constitution, such an expansive Bill of
Rights, and such impressive constitutional jurisprudence, could generate
such negative and retrogressive attitudes towards women? In line with
this inquiry, my paper will raise three questions. The first focuses on
19. See Usha Roopnarain, A Gendered Perspective on Violence in South Africa, 2
FEMINISTA no. 11, http://www.feminista.com/archives/v2n Il/roopnarain.html.
20. What made Mr. Zuma's admission so startling was that he had served as head of
the South African Natural AIDS task force. Some have argued that his admission set the fight
against AIDS back a few decades. See Dan Strumpf, Testimony Pushes Back AIDS Battle,
MAIL & GuARDIN ONLINE, Apr. 8, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=
268801 &area=/insight/insight _nationall. See also Wines, supra note 3.
21. See Wines, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See The State v. Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma 2006 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.legalbrief.co.za/filemgmt-data/files/State%20v%2OJacob%2OZuma.pdf.
[15:41
Learning to Love
the legacy of apartheid violence and specifically the cultures of
masculinity, the underbelly of apartheid violence. Second, I will
explore the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC), a vital part of the post-conflict transformation agenda, to
examine the manner in which the TRC pursued violations of women's
human rights. The final part of my analysis is an examination of the last
twelve years of post-conflict constitutional transformation in South
Africa, and particularly the incorporation of gender equality in this
expansive constitutional framework. This enquiry will entail an exa-
mination of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, especially the
Court's embrace of a substantive equality, in addition to an unambig-
uously clear commitment to the eradication of violence against women.
In many ways South Africa is a microcosm for other societies,
particularly those poorer countries that are embarking on democratic
projects of political and legal transformation in the wake of colonial or
authoritarian legacies. Many of these societies, often saddled with vast
economic disparities, typically confront conflicts over the nature of
gender equality, on the other hand, and respect for indigenous and
religious cultural norms, on the other. Very often, the process of
democratization, and legal attempts toward gender equality embrace
ambiguities and complexities for women.2" The realities for women
reflect both the conditions of victimhood, as well as agency. This
dichotomy, between women as victim or autonomous agent reflects a
constant tension in feminist legal scholarship and this theme of
ambiguity and complexity undergirds women's advocacy, and
influences feminist legal theory.26 South Africa's democracy project
reflects this ambiguity in stark terms, representing a society in which
the statistics of violence against women is very alarming, and where
such statistics exist alongside very positive indicators, such as
impressive statistics on female representations in Parliament, and
women's substantial participation in public life generally.27
25. See Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race
Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373 (2000).
26. See generally ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL
THEORY (N.Y. Univ. Press 2006); EuzABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (Yale Univ. Press 2000).
27. See MAVIVI MANZINI MAYAKAYAKA, Political Party-Quotas in South Africa, in
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF QUOTAS: AFRICAN EXPERIENCES (Julie Ballington ed., 2004), avail-
able at http://www.idea.int/loader.cfmurl/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm &pageid=7841.
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CULTURES OF MASCULINITY
Scholarship in South Africa has identified three components of the
cultures of masculinity, and in this paper I am going to present them in
a synthesized and generalized form. The first component of this culture
of masculinity has its genesis in the system of apartheid, and in parti-
cular, the militarization of that system. This militarization included
compulsory military service for white males, and the development and
maintenance of a massive military establishment.2" As the scope and
the intensity of opposition to the system of apartheid grew, both within
South Africa and outside its borders, this huge military apparatus, in
tandem with a ubiquitous and repressive security establishment, em-
barked on successive systemic and vicious campaign to stifle political
opposition, that involved methods of torture, banishment, detention, and
targeted assassinations.29 The final report of the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission outlines in graphic detail the absolute extent to which
the apartheid military and security establishment went to stifle the
political opposition of the majority of South Africans to apartheid rule.3"
The features of this apartheid masculinist culture is replicated in the
institutions of the dominant white culture, as illustrated in sport, in the
elite professions such as medicine and law, in the media and in other
aspects of South African society.3
The second component of this masculinist culture is what I will
crudely term, the masculine culture of opposition. This culture is a by-
product of some of the strategies adopted by the national liberation
movements in exile, that waged a protracted and clandestine military
28. See Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Women's Contributions to South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, WOMEN WAGING PEACE POLICY COMMISSION (2005),
http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/SouthAfiicaTJFullCaseStudy.pdf; see also
Graeme Simpson, A Brief Evaluation of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
Some Lessons for Societies in Transition, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND
RECONCILIATION (1998), http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/paptrce2.htm.
29. See Jacklyn Cock, Women, The Military and Militarisation: Some Questions Raised
by the South African Case, SEMINAR ATTHEUNIVERSITY OFWITWATERSRAND (Sept. 24, 1992),
http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papcock2.htm.
30. THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT, vol. 6,
§ 3, ch. 1, 186-92.
3 1. See Joanne Fedler, Legal Education in South Africa, 72 OR. L. REv. 999 (1993);
Cock, supra note 29.
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campaign against the apartheid government.32 The very nature of this
clandestine military struggle, and the inevitable absence of transparency
and accountability, despite popular rhetoric, reinforced patterns of
masculinity that disadvantaged women disproportionately. 3 In addition
to the military campaign conducted by South African exiles, there was
the anti-apartheid campaigns carried out in the black townships of South
Africa.34 These campaigns entailed a certain level of myth creation
referencing masculinity to quite an extraordinary extent. The politically
respectable "comrade" involved a political identity that personified the
identity of a brave man confronting the brutality of the apartheid
military and security apparatus.35
The myth of the brave comrade was steeped in the political and social
reality of a brutal struggle that took tremendous courage and tenacity.36
This combination of clandestine liberation movement in exile and
internal political struggle, also involved a political strategy to make the
townships of South Africa ungovernable. And the townships did, in
fact, became ungovernable, contributing in no small part to the political
events that eventually led to a negotiated settlement.37 But part of the
conditions of ungovernability of the black townships was excessive
violence toward women, a violence that was hidden from the national
32. See Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Leaflet, Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe
(1961), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/manifesto-mk.html.
33. See Tumi Makgetla, Zuma Trial Lifts the Lid on Gender Based Violence During
Exile, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?
articleid=267002&area=/insight/insightcnational. See also Jacklyn Cock, Women and
Militarism in South Africa, REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 45 (1989).
34. Campbell, supra note 1, at 624.
35. Id. As one "comrade" noted: I would like to die when lam old, but now as I have
devoted myself to the struggle I know that one day I will be killed by the bullet of the Boer or
by their puppets. This means that I will die young. I have devoted myself to being a comrade,
so there is no need to be afraid. I am not afraid of anything. Id.
36. See Ari Sitas, The Making ofthe 'Comrades'Movement in Natal, 1985-91, 18 J. S.
AFR. STUDIES 692 (1992).
37. See ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF
SOUTH AFRICA'S ROAD TO CHANGE (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1996); see also ALLISTER SPARKS,
FROM COMRADES TO CITIZENS: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CiviCS MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY (Glenn Adler & Johnny Steinberg eds., 2000).
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discourse around liberation.38 The legacy of this culture of violence
lingers.
The third component of this masculinist culture in South Africa was
a patriarchy rooted in some indigenous and religious institutions, and in
indigenous and religious practices that subordinate and disadvantage
women in a host of areas, including the custody of children, access to
property, and rights to inheritance. 39 That culture also persists.
Indeed, a combination of these cultures in South Africa has spawned
a peculiarly South African ubiquitous masculinity. In fact, Judge Albie
Sachs of the Constitutional Court, has referred to patriarchy as the only
"truly nonracial institution in South Africa."'  Overcoming this
complex, interweaving masculinist culture requires not only purposive
legal interventions, but also the conscription of intensive extra-legal
ones that may emanate from vigorous civil society campaigns, and
particularly from those conducted by a vigilant women's movement. 1
THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The Constitution as a forward-looking mechanism, sets out the values
of the new democratic South Africa.42 Despite the lofty ideals set out
in the Constitution, those who negotiated the transition to democracy
38. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 625. Campbell notes: "The political terrain was
seen as dangerous, conflictual and violent, and demarcated as a male preserve...." Id. at 624-
25.
39. See Christina Murray & Felicity Kaganis, Equality and Culture in South Africa's
Interim Constitution, 5 OXFORD INT'L L. REv. 17 (1994); Ronald Thandabantu Nhlapo,
International Protection of Human Rights and the Family: African Variations on a Common
Theme, 3 INT'LJ. L. &FAM. 1 (1989).
40. See Albie Sachs, Judges and Gender: The Constitutional Rights of Women in a
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 7 AGENDA I (1990).
41. See Sheila Meintjes, Gender, Citizenship and Democracy in post-Apartheid South
Africa, GENDER RESEARCH PRoJEcr BULLETIN (1997).
42. THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 17, ch. 1, § 1, the Founding Provisions of the
Constitution, states the following values on which the democratic South Africa is based:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and
a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness.
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recognized that the immense violations of human rights under apartheid
had to be addressed.43 This was not just an academic question for South
Africans, since those violations were evident in all aspects of South
African life. Indeed, the legacy of apartheid as evidenced by the
overwhelming poverty and the huge economic disparities, in addition
to alarming levels of violence, will continue to plague the society for
several generations." The United Nations had declared apartheid a
crime against humanity,45 a declaration that could generate upwards of
40 million victims.' As a practical matter, however, the political
negotiations that led to the drafting of the Constitution, resulted in a
workable, but limited compromise mechanism, within which gross
violations of human rights could be dealt with. The compromise
reached was the passage of the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, the empowering statute that set up the TRC.a7
The TRC has been heralded internationally as an impressive process
and has been lauded almost universally by human rights advocates.4
Indeed, in the literature referencing racial reconciliation and restorative
justice, the TRC looms large. Whether it is the iconic image of Bishop
Tutu shepherding an emotionally-laden process through difficult
political and legal territory, or the comforting images of victim and
perpetrator engaging in a dance of forgiveness and remorse, the TRC is
mostly regarded as a pre-eminent national exercise in forgiveness.49
Within South Africa, however, the assessment of the TRC is much more
contested. Indeed the limitations of the TRC have been scrutinized in
some detail, and there is some evidence about deep misgivings of the
43. See generally KADER ASMAL ET AL, RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A
RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 1997); ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY
UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2000).
44. See INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, APARTHEID:
THE FACTS (1983).
45. See G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 75, U.N. Doc. A/3068 (Nov. 30, 1973).
46. Id.
47. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
48. See, e.g., MARTHA MINTOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFuCr AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).
49. Penelope E. Andrews, A Grand Exercise in Forgiveness, or Justice Held Hostage
to Truth? South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 236
(2000) (reviewing David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth,
Reconcilitation, and the Apartheid Legal Order (1998)).
20071
Michigan State Journal of International Law
TRC, particularly from the victims.50 In fact, a group of TRC-
designated victims and others have filed a lawsuit in the United States
against corporations including General Motors, IBM, and Citibank.5
This lawsuit is a direct result of their dissatisfaction with the TRC. It
is ironic that the purpose of establishing the TRC was to emphasize the
principles of restorative justice in lieu of the more traditional notions
of punitive justice, as typified by lawsuits.52
An examination of the overall success or failure of the TRC is outside
the scope of this paper.53 However, most commentators have concluded
that South Africa could not move forward as a functioning democracy
if the TRC had not been established.54 Although a document of political
compromise, it had a limited but significant role to play within the
broader project of transformation. The concerns of this paper, however,
are, with respect to gender equality, and in particular the manner in
which the TRC gave short shrift to those women who were the victims
of apartheid.
The TRC did this at the outset by the definition of "victim" which the
Act established. The Act only considered victims of gross violations of
human rights; in other words, those individuals who were subjected to
torture, kidnapping, and other human rights violations committed by the
South African security establishment.55 This circumscribed definition
in effect excluded from its ambit millions of women who daily were
subjected to the degradations of apartheid, including the destruction of
family life through the operation of the pass law or the migrant labor
50. See Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid Victim: The Path to
Reconciliation? 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155 (2004); see also Catherine Jenkins, After the Dry
White Season: The Dilemma of Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa, 16 S. AFR. J.
ON HuM. RTS. 415 (2000).
51. Andrews, supra note 50; see also Jenkins, supra note 50.
52. See DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999). For an analysis
of the principles of restorative justice, see A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER (Gerry Johnstone
ed., 2003).
53. For a thorough examination of the TRC, see COMMISSIONING THE PAST:
UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND RECONCIJATION COMMISSION (Deborah Posel
& Graeme Simpson eds., 2002); ANTJE KROG, COUNTRY OFMY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW AND
THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1998).
54. See COMMISSIONING THE PAST, supra note 53; KROG, supra note 53.
55. In terms of the Act, "victim" includes persons who suffered injury as a result of"a
gross violation of human rights" or "an act associated with a political object." Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, supra note 48, ch. I(l)(xix).
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system.56 In addition, the lethal cocktail of apartheid masculinities
exposed women to systemic violence, both in the public and private
sphere.57
The number of victims certified by the TRC was 22,000,58 a rather
tiny amount in the light of over three hundred years of colonialism, and
forty plus years of apartheid. The TRC, for the most part, focused on
men and the violations that they were subjected to. But it was only
when women started lobbying the TRC, complaining that the abuse of
women under apartheid was not being considered, that the TRC
responded by organizing three days of women's hearings.59 Until that
time, women who appeared before the TRC' s Human Rights Violations
Committee were largely seen as "secondary victims."' In other words,
they testified as mothers, wives, and sisters, referencing the suffering of
their male relatives. 6' As an observer who noted, the TRC located
women in the "private realm as supporters of men," but not in the public
realm as "resisters of oppression. 6 2
The women who testified before the TRC in the three-day hearings
complained about a whole host of issues, including the fact that the
media did not regard their testimony as noteworthy, compared to the
testimony of men.63 Indeed, female witnesses were labeled by the
media as the "crying team" of the Commission.' In addition, they
noted that three days of hearings were not sufficient to fully interrogate
the range of human rights violations that women were subjected to.65
Because sexual violence against women were committed both by the
apartheid government and the liberation movement in exile, there was
56. See Cheryl L. Poinsette, Black Women UnderApartheid: An Introduction, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 93 (1985); see also Penelope Andrews, The Legal Underpinnings of Gender
Oppression in Apartheid South Africa, 3 Ausm. J. L. & Soc. 1 (1986).
57. Beth Goldblatt & Sheila Meintjies, Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: A Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996),
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/submit/gender.htm.
58. Id.
59. Lynn Graybill, The Contribution of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Toward the Promotion of Women's Rights in South Africa, 24 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 1, 4
(2001).
60. Id. at 4.
61. Goldblatt, supra note 57.
62. Graybill, supra note 59, at 4.
63. See Gobodo-Madikizela, supra note 28, at vii.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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no doubt a measure of discomfort about these public revelations, since
very senior men were in danger of being exposed.' In addition, in a
very religious country like South Africa, the more graphic details of
sexual violations would have rendered women vulnerable to ridicule
and contempt."
In its final report, the TRC emphasizes the need for national
reconciliation and the creation of a human rights culture.68 A glaring
absence of the report is its failure to address the systemic nature of
violence against women in South Africa. In fact, the TRC, in final
analysis, was a rather sanitized process, that did not deal sufficiently
with the various ways in which women were oppressed. Several factors
may have contributed to this omission, including a broad societal
inability to appreciate the role of women in the popular struggle and
particularly the liberation movement. In other words, there appears to
be a deficiency in cognitively accepting the role of women as autono-
mous political agents.69 These attitudes mirror the societal vision of
women as persistent secondary partners, whether in the home or in
public places, and particularly the broader anti-apartheid movement.7"
In addition, the TRC failed to sufficiently appreciate the very quantita-
tive and qualitative nature of violence against women including sexual
violence and sexual harassment.7 The failure of the TRC to address
violence against women in its processes may have deprived women
advocates of a valuable opportunity to confront apartheid sexualized
violence in a comprehensive manner.
FROM RACISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY
In 1994, South Africa emerged from a racist, authoritarian state, with
a minority white government, to one premised on democracy and
human rights for all its citizens.72 Underpinning this democratic
66. Goldblatt, supra note 57.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See CHERYL WALKER, WOMEN AND RESISTANCE IN SouTH AFRICA (Onyx Press
1982).
70. Graybill, supra note 59, at 2-3.
71. See THE TRUTH AND RECONCILATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT,
supra note 30.
72. See Sparks, supra note 37; see also TOM LODGE, POLTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA: FROM
MANDELA TO MBEKI (2002).
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arrangement was a constitutional framework embracing a comprehen-
sive Bill of Rights. For the purposes of this paper, I will concentrate on
a few significant provisions that bear directly on the issue of gender
equality and violence against women. 7' The first is the manner in which
the Bill of Rights outlaws discrimination on several grounds, both
directly and indirectly.74 This includes the manner in which the Bill of
Rights recognizes the concept of intersectionality discrimination; in
other words, the Bill of Rights outlaws discrimination on one or several
grounds. In particular the Bill of Rights provides that discrimination
"on one or more grounds ... is unfair .... ,7 In the United States this
notion of intersectionality discrimination has been difficult to pursue,
since the courts appear to be reluctant to accept claims based on such a
theory.76
The second way in which the South African Bill of Rights is quite
unique is the number of grounds protected; which includes race, gender,
pregnancy, marital status, sexual orientation, ethnic or social origin, and
a few others." The grounds of discrimination covered are therefore
extremely extensive. What is noteworthy about the Constitution,
particularly in comparison to the universe of constitutionalism in the
United States, is that affirmative action is incorporated in the Bill of
Rights as consonant with equality.78
With respect to violence against women, the Bill of Rights specifi-
cally states that "everyone has the right to bodily and physical integrity,
which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and
73. For a comprehensive discussion of gender equality in the South Africa Constitution,
see THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE (Sandra Liebenberg
ed., 1994). See also GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (Christina Murray
ed., 1994) and Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South
Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307 (1998).
74. THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 17, § 9(3). "The state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." Id.
75. Id. § 9(5).
76. See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as Catch 22: Why Identity Performance
Demands are Neither Harmless or Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005).
77. See THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 17.
78. THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 17, § 9(2) provides that: "Equality includes the full
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality,
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken."
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to security and control of the person."79 The Bill of Rights also provides
that everyone has the right to "freedom and security of the person;, 8°
this includes the right "to be free from all forms of violence from either
public or private sources. '81 The right to security of the person also
includes a prohibition on torture and "cruel, inhuman or degrading"
treatment.2 For victims of domestic violence, this particular aspect of
the Bill of Rights has resulted in far-reaching legislation that has
outlawed domestic violence.13 The Preamble to the Domestic Violence
Act recognizes the systemic nature of domestic violence, referring to it
as "a serious social evil." The definition of domestic violence is parti-
cularly comprehensive, that includes not just physical abuse, but also
economic abuse, as well as harassment, emotional and psychological
abuse.85
Another fairly unique feature of the Bill of Rights is its vertical as
well as horizontal reach. In other words, the Bill of Rights has applica-
tion as between government and its citizens, as well as those betweencitizens.86 This provision renders the South African Constitution a far
more potent force regarding its capacity to eradicate the more egregious
aspects of violence against women. Indeed, women's advocates have
long argued that in order to pursue gender equality and eradicate
violence against women, attention must be paid to the myriad ways that
79. Id. § 12(2).
80. Id. § 12(1).
81. Id. § 12(1)(c).
82. Id. §§ 12(1)(d) and (e). Some feminist legal scholars have argued that systemic
domestic battery could be considered a form of torture. See Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror:
Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONALPERSPECTVES 116 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994).
83. See Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
84. Id. The Preamble notes:
"Recognizing that domestic violence is a serious social evil; that there is a high
incidence of domestic violence within South African society; that victims of domestic
violence are among the most vulnerable members of society; that domestic violence
takes on many forms; that acts of domestic violence may be committed in a wide
range of domestic relationships . Id.
85. Id. § 1.
86. THE CONSTrrUTION, supra note 17, § 9(4) provides that: "No person may unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one more more grounds . For a
discussion of the horizontal application of human rights in South Africa, see Johan Van der
Walt, Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights and the Threshold of the Law in View of
the Carmichele Saga, 19 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 517 (2003).
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private discrimination and private forms of violence reflect the daily
realities of many women, who experience such discrimination and
violence regularly, and systematically.17 The state therefore has the
obligation to aggressively intervene to protect women from both public
and private violence.
Another striking feature of the South African Constitution is the
mandate to consider foreign and international law in judicial delibera-
tions.88 In the United States, the courts tend to be more self-referential
and introspective, even though many scholars have been advocating for
the consideration of foreign and international law in federal case law. 89
But South Africa has also been a beneficiary of the American civil
rights struggle and the global human rights struggles. The gains of the
American civil rights struggle were apparent to South Africans decades
before apartheid was abolished, and South African public interest
lawyers utilized strategies adopted by American civil rights lawyers to
pursue challenges to the apartheid government.90 In addition, the anti-
apartheid movement became a global struggle, and the vast incorpora-
tion of international human rights principles in the South African
Constitution is a testament to the victory of that struggle.9' As Makau
wa Mutua, the Kenyan human rights scholar notes:
The construction of the post-apartheid state represents the first deliberate and
calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state-a polity that is
primarily animated by human rights norms. South Africa was the first state
to be reborn after the universal acceptance (at least rhetorically) of human
rights ideals by states of all the major cultural and political traditions."
At the end of the 20th century, the South African Constitution
became one of the most significant human rights documents, highly
87. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989); see also FARANDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE (2005).
88. THE CONSTiTurION, supra note 17, § 39(l) provides that "when interpreting the Bill
of Rights, a court ... must consider international law."
89. See Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights:
A Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 59 (1998-2000).
90. See Penelope E. Andrews, Perspectives on Brown: The South African Experience,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1155 (2004-05).
91. Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 63 (1997).
92. Id. at 65.
2007]
Michigan State Journal of International Law
applauded and constantly referenced.93 In the final analysis South
Africa had the benefit of looking north towards the continent of Africa,
at looking across the ocean at the United States, and looking at many
places where human rights activism led to democratic transformation,
including the passage of human rights legislation. These observations
and lessons learnt meant that South Africans could realistically assess
and appreciate what is essential to transform the lives of its citizen, and
in particular its black citizens, and women.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The South African Constitutional Court has attempted very pur-
posively to contextualize gender discrimination in South Africa, and in
particular violence against women. For example, Justice Sachs, in
assessing the constitutionality of a domestic violence statute, noted:
All crime has harsh effects on society. What distinguishes domestic
violence is its hidden repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple
effects on our society and in particular, on family life. It cuts across
class, race, culture and geography, and is all the more pernicious
because it is so often concealed and so frequently goes unpunished."
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court illustrates a vigorous
approach to pursuing gender equality, and the Court's decisions reflect
a broad consensus of the judges regarding these equality issues. Indeed,
in almost all of the gender equality judgments, the Court has attempted
to embrace a comprehensive substantive equality, eschewing a mere
formal approach to equality. 95 For example, one of the first equality
cases that the Court considered, involved a challenge to the provisions
of the Child Care Act, that permitted separate, and outwardly
discriminating criteria, for adoption of children born in and out of
93. See Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjucating Constitutional Priorities in a
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16
S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 206 (2000).
94. S v. Baloyi 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC) at I 11 (S. Afr.); see also Omar v. The
Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2006 (2) BCLR 253 (CC) (S. Aft.).
95. But note critiques of the Court's approach to equality. See Cathi Albertyn & Beth
Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 248 (1998); Dennis Davis,
The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L. J. 398 (1999).
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wedlock.96 With respect to the former, the consent of the father for
adoption was required, but dispensed with in the latter situation. 97 A
father, whose child was born out of wedlock and who was adopted
without his consent, challenged the constitutionality of the statute,
claiming it violated his equality rights under the Constitution.9" His
challenge was successful, although the Court, citing the best interests of
the child, declined further appeals to set aside the adoption. 9 In its
analysis, the Court focused on the distinction between "legitimate" and
"illegitimate" children, finding the distinction spurious.'l° In addition,
the Court noted the many systems of marriage in South Africa, includ-
ing those conducted under the auspices of religious or indigenous legalsystems. °10 These forms of marriage were historically not recognized
under the South African legal system, and consequently left fathers in
a vulnerable position regarding the adoption of their children." 2
Another case, one that pursued a comprehensive analysis of the
equality provisions, involved a challenge by a convicted male prisoner
to the constitutionality of a Presidential pardon, issued by Presidential
Nelson Mandela to mark his inauguration. 3 The pardon included
certain categories of prisoners, including women who had children
under the age of twelve at the time of South Africa's first election."
The prisoner claimed that the Presidential pardon violated his rights to
equality and that it discriminated against him on the basis of sex."'O The
Court, although finding the discrimination unfair, found that such
discrimination was justified in the context of the realities of child-
rearing in South Africa, in which women were disproportionately
burdened." Recognizing that women, the most disadvantaged group
96. Fraser v. Naude & Another 1998 (11) BCLR 1 (CC) at 3 (S. Aft.).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Court had occasion to consider the validity of a marriage conducted according
to Muslim law, involving the issue of inheritance, and found for all intents and purposes that
it was a valid one. See Davis, supra note 95.
103. President of the Republic of South Africa & Another v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR I
(CC) at 8 (S. Aft.).
104. Id. at 34-35.
105. Id. at 35.
106. Id. at 46-48.
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in South African society, would benefit substantially from the pardon,
the Court did not allow the challenge to succeed.° 7 The Court drew a
distinction between the situation pertaining to the pardon, namely one
that provided a benefit to women, and to the historical disadvantages
that women labored under on the basis of their gender."0 ' The Court
acknowledged that mothers are the primary caregivers of children, but
it also pointed out that this reinforced a stereotype about women,
particularly in relation to child rearing and child bearing."°9 Despite
this, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach, locating this issue in the
realities of the South African context, and found that the discrimination
was justified. "0
The judgments of the Constitutional Court with respect to violence
against women also reflect such a holistic, comprehensive engagement,
and the Court has interpreted the constitutional mandate to eradicate
violence vigorously. The Court has embraced international documents,
like the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW)" and the Vienna Declaration on Violence
Against Women" 2 in its judgments, and in the process has forcefully
given its imprimatur in stemming violence against women.
In a 1999 judgment, the Court had to consider the constitutionality of
a domestic violence statute 113 that had been declared invalid by a lower
court and that had referred its finding to the Constitutional Court for
confirmation." 4 The lower court's declaration of invalidity was based
on three findings: that the subsection under review "places a reverse
107. Id. at 49-50.
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id.
110. The dissent forcefully challenged the stereotypes that the majority opinion appeared
to perpetuate. It stated very clearly that the Constitution was meant to be transformative, that
required a vision of rejecting stereotypes, especially one that did not allow greater capacity for
fathers as care givers of children. See President of the Republic of South Africa & Another v.
Hugo, supra note 103, at 73 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
111. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession at the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180,
U.N. Doc. 34/180 (Dec. 18 1979).
112. G.A. Res. 157/23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/157/23 (June 25, 1993), available at
http:/Iwww.unhchr.chlhuridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF. 157.23.En?OpenDocument.
113. The Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. For a discussion of the
statute, see Joanna Fedler, Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the Prevention of Family
Violence Act 1993 - An Evaluation After a Year in Operation, 12 S. AFRICAN L. J. 231 (1995).
114. See S. v. Baloyi, supra note 94.
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onus of proving absence of guilt on a person charged with breach of a
family violence interdict," conflicting with the constitutionally pro-
tected presumption of innocence, without compelling constitutional
justification." 5 The case presented the opportunity for the Constitu-
tional Court to confront the vexed issue of domestic violence, and to
balance the need to eradicate domestic violence with the constitutional
rights of accused persons to a fair trial." 6
The Court referenced the Constitution's requirement that the problem
of domestic violence be dealt with effectively and comprehensively." 7
Writing for the majority, Sachs J. described the "hidden and repetitive
character" of domestic violence and its ubiquity in cutting across the
categories of class, race, culture, and geography." 8 Moreover, because
domestic violence is so gender specific, it mirrors and mimics
patriarchal domination in a particularly abhorrent way." 9 In a
purposively victim-centered opinion, the Court referenced South
Africa's obligations under international law to stem violence against
women, particularly those under CEDAW and the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights. 2 ' Referring to the "strange alchemy of
violence within intimacy," the Court emphasized that this issue needs
to be dealt with through the use of innovative legal methods.''
The Court therefore found that the Act passed constitutional muster
in light of the severity of the problem of violence against women, and
that judicial officers are to be accorded some latitude in dealing with
procedural imperatives.'22
But the one area that could potentially raise significant contestation
relates to the issue of the status and role of indigenous institutions and
laws. It is arguable that there is some consensus in the country regard-
ing the eradication of the cultures of masculinity, no matter their
genesis, and the inappropriateness of the existence of such cultural
115. Id.
116. 1d.
117. Id.
118. Id. 11.
119. Id. 12. Although men can also be victims of domestic violence, their numbers
compared to women are miniscule.
120. AFRIcAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (June 27, 1981),
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html.
121. S. v. Baloyi, supra note 94, 1 16.
122. Id. 130.
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norms in South Africa today has been questioned persistently. How-
ever, with respect to indigenous institutions and laws, the conversation
has a somewhat different flavor. This is so because the process of
democratization in South Africa was at the core a process of
Africanization. South Africa had to transform itself from a European
country in Africa, to one that was a member of the community of
African states. This Africanization process carries with it an imperative
to embrace indigenous laws, traditions as part of the democratic
project. 23 But in a situation of conflict between gender equality and
indigenous institutions, what principle prevails?
The Constitution attempts to answer this question in a careful
balancing act: the Bill of Rights renders equality as the pre-eminent
principle, while recognizing the legitimacy of cultural institutions. 24 In
addition, the Constitutional Court, in an early case confronting this
issues squarely, namely, the conflict between an indigenous law and the
principle of gender equality, the Court provided a definitive statement
that respect for indigenous institutions does not have to entail
condonation of gender discrimination.2 In that case the Court had to
evaluate a constitutional challenge to the rule of male primogeniture
applicable under the African customary of succession.126 In terms of the
rule, females were prevented from inheriting from the deceased estates
of their late fathers; this rule also applied to boys when their parents
were not legally married.'27 Holding that such a rule discriminates
against women and illegitimate children, the majority held that rule to
123. See Martin Chanock, Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an
Era of Family Law Reform, INT'L J. L. & FAM. 72 (1989); see also lain Curry, The Future of
Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo Debate, AcrA JURIDICA 146 (1994).
124. THE CONsTrLMON, supra note 17, § 31 provides that:
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be
denied the right, with other members of that community,
(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural ... associations and other organs of civil
society.
(2) The rights may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provisions of
the Bill of Rights.
125. Bhe & Others v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) BCLR I (CC) at 109
(S. Afr.).
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 49.
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be unconstitutional.' 2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Langa
stated:
The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear
violation of .... the Constitution. It is a form of discrimination that en-
trenches past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable group, exacerbated
by old notions of patriarchy and male domination incompatible with the
guarantee of equality .......
The Court also found that the rule violated a woman's right to dignity
under the Constitution. 3 ' The majority opinion therefore indicates an
appreciation by the Court of the need to entrench gender equality while
at the same time recognizing the importance of indigenous institutions
and laws to a large number of South Africans.
The pursuit of gender equality and elimination of cultural attitudes
that lead to violence against women in South Africa is one of the most
trying issues confronting South Africans. It is particularly difficult
because the eradication of gender discrimination was for a long time
marginal to the eradication of race discrimination.' Several reasons
account for this, but an obvious was strategic, that is, the elimination of
apartheid was seen as an attainable goal, both within South Africa and
internationally. The elimination of sex-discrimination, both within
South Africa and globally, still remains an evolving aspiration with
limited consensus. In addition, although women participated fully in
the anti-apartheid struggle, they did so as anti-apartheid activists first,
and only secondarily as activists for women's rights."' In summary,
feminism in South Africa constantly has to compete with other
liberatory discourses, in particular nationalism, and often is relegated a
lesser status in this struggle.'33
128. Id. at 57.
129. Id. at 56.
130. Id.
131. See Penelope E. Andrews, The Stepchild of National Liberation: Women and Rights
in the New South Africa, in THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH
AFRICA'S BASIC LAW 326 (Penelope E. Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001).
132. This is reflected in the major texts written by prominent women in South Africa
during the anti-apartheid struggle. See, e.g., WINNIE MANDELA, PART OF MY SOUL (1985);
ELLEN KUZWAYO, CALL ME WOMAN (1985); FATIMA MEER, PRISON DIARY (2002).
133. See Thenjiwe Mtsintso, Women in MK, 80 WORK IN PROGRESS 18 (1992),
http://disa.nu.ac.za/articledisplaypage.asp?articletitle=Umkhonto+we+Sizwe+-
+Women+in+MK&filename=WPJan92.
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CONCLUSION
In the final analysis the quest for gender equality is substantially
dependent on a legal framework that not only signifies clearly the
primacy of the principle of gender equality through the substance of the
laws, but also one that contains within it solid implementation and
enforcement processes. But even such a legal framework is quite
limited in light of the durability of the cultures of masculinity
mentioned early on in this paper. In addition, although not covered in
this paper, the commitment of all levels of the South African govern-
ment to eradicating poverty, in light of the distressing levels of econo-
mic inequality, and the socio-economic jurisprudence of the Constitu-
tional Court, will go some ways in attaining gender equality and
eliminating violence against women.
